

Message Text

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL NATO CAPITALS IMMEDIATE

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AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY BERN

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, MPOL, XG, SW, FI

SUBJECT: GUIDANCE: NORDIC NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE

1. BACKGROUND: SPEAKING IN STOCKHOLM ON MAY 8, PRESIDENT KEKKONEN OF FINLAND PROPOSED THAT THE NORDIC STATES AND THE GREAT POWERS NEGOTIATE A TREATY "ISOLATING THE NORDIC COUNTRIES FROM THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY IN GENERAL

AND NEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY IN PARTICULAR." KEKKONEN SUGGESTED THAT THE 1963 FINNISH PROPOSAL FOR A NORDIC NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE (NWFZ) MIGHT SERVE AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE AND THAT "NEGATIVE SECURITY GUARANTEES" MIGHT BE A KEY ELEMENT OF THE TREATY. DEPARTING FROM THE STANDARD CONCEPT OF A NWFZ, THE FINNISH PROPOSAL SINGLES OUT "NEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY" AS DESERVING SPECIAL ATTENTION AND MENTIONS THE "NEUTRON BOMB" AND CRUISE MISSILES AS SPECIFIC EXAMPLES, WHILE IGNORING THE SOVIET'S NEW SS-20 AND THE RECENT SOVIET STATIONING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SUB-MARINES IN THE BALTIC. (ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND INCLUDED IN HELSINKI 1916 BEING REPEATED TO ALL ADDRESSEES.)

2. SPEAKING AT THE UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT (SSOD) ON JUNE 1, FINNISH FOREIGN MINISTER VAYRYNEN CALLED ATTENTION TO PRESIDENT KEKKONEN'S PROPOSAL FOR A NORDIC NWFZ. IN ADDITION HE SAID, BEGIN QUOTE NO NEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS

SHOULD BE DEVELOPED OR DEPLOYED BY ANYONE. AT THE SAME TIME, NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD NOT BE INTRODUCED INTO OR DEPLOYED IN THE AREAS WHERE THEY HAVE NOT EXISTED. NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES ARE THE BEST MEANS TO GUARD AGAINST THAT. FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON

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COUNTRIES IT WOULD BE REASONABLE TO EXPECT OF THE NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES THAT THEY WOULD GIVE ASSURANCES NOT TO USE OR THREATEN TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST STATES COMMITTED TO NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE STATUS. END QUOTE.

3. ANALYSIS: FROM ALL INDICATIONS THE FINNS THEMSELVES DECIDED TO DUST OFF THEIR OLD NORDIC NWFZ PROPOSAL AND PUT IT FORWARD AGAIN. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE IDEA WAS REVIVED IN THE PROCESS OF AN OVERALL REVIEW OF DISARMAMENT ISSUES IN PREPARATION FOR THE SSOD, WHICH WOULD ALSO EXPLAIN THE TIMING. THE FINNISH GOVERNMENT APPARENTLY INTENDS TO PURSUE THE INITIATIVE ACTIVELY IN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

4. BOTH NORWAY AND DENMARK, AS A MATTER OF NATIONAL POLICY, DO NOT PERMIT NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO BE STATIONED ON THEIR TERRITORY IN PEACETIME, EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE MEMBERS OF NATO. SWEDEN AND FINLAND BOTH HAVE FIRM NATIONAL POLICIES AGAINST ACQUIRING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ARE STRONG NPT PRO-PONENTS. THUS, THE CONTINENTAL NORDIC STATES ALREADY CONSTITUTE AN AREA THAT IS FREE FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT PRESENT. HOWEVER, BOTH NORWAY AND DENMARK PARTICIPATE IN NATO NUCLEAR PLANNING AND VIEW NATO'S NUCLEAR POSTURE AS AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE DETERRENT AGAINST SOVIET AGGRESSION. NEITHER WILL BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT THE FINNISH PROPOSAL, BUT NEITHER WILL WANT TO BEAR THE BLAME FOR REJECTING IT FLATLY. SIMILARLY, THOUGH SWEDEN HAS PUBLICLY

OFFERED TO DISCUSS THE KEKKONEN PLAN IT HAS ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT IT COULD NOT SUPPORT THE INITIATIVE AS PRESENTLY CONCEIVED.

5. ON THE ONE HAND, THE SOVIETS WOULD PROBABLY LIKE TO SEE A PURELY NORDIC NWFZ WHICH, IN EFFECT, COULD LEGALLY FORECLOSE THE POSSIBILITY OF NATO NUCLEAR WEAPONS BEING PLACED ON NORWEGIAN OR DANISH TERRITORY IN WARTIME. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SOVIETS REALIZE THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO

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FORMALIZE A NORDIC NWFZ WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BRING INTO QUESTION SOVIET NUCLEAR FORCES STATIONED IN ADJACENT TERRITORY OR OPERATING IN THE BALTIC, AND OTHER ADJACENT SEAS, AND THEY WOULD PREFER TO AVOID HAVING THIS QUESTION RAISED. THUS, ON BALANCE THE SOVIETS WOULD PROBABLY NOT LIKE TO SEE THE FINNISH PROPOSAL PURSUED AT THIS TIME, BUT LIKE NORWEGIANS AND THE DANES, THEY DO NOT WISH TO BEAR THE ONUS FOR QUASHING IT.

6. IN SUM, THE FINNISH PROPOSAL IS UNLIKELY TO RECEIVE THE SUPPORT FROM WITHIN THE REGION NECESSARY TO BRING ABOUT ITS ACTIVE CONSIDERATION.

7. US POSITION ON NWFZS: THE US FAVORS THE CREATION OF NWFZS UNDER APPROPRIATE CONDITIONS. IN THIS REGARD, US SPOKESMEN HAVE CITED THE FOLLOWING FOUR BASIC CRITERIA IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS:

A. THE INITIATIVE FOR THE CREATION OF THE ZONE SHOULD COME FROM STATES IN THE REGION CONCERNED.

B. ALL STATES WHOSE PARTICIPATION IS DEEMED IMPORTANT SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE ZONE.

C. THE ZONE ARRANGEMENT SHOULD PROVIDE FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE ZONE'S PROVISIONS.

D. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ZONE SHOULD NOT DISTURB EXISTING SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS TO THE DETRIMENT OF REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.

8. IN ADDITION, AT VARIOUS TIMES US SPOKESMEN HAVE RAISED THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL POINTS:

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A. THE ZONE ARRANGEMENT SHOULD EFFECTIVELY PROHIBIT ITS PARTIES FROM DEVELOPING ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE, FOR WHATEVER PURPOSE.

B. THE ZONE ARRANGEMENT SHOULD NOT SEEK TO IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS ON THE EXERCISE BY OTHER STATES OF RIGHTS RECOGNIZED UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION ON THE HIGH SEAS, IN INTERNATIONAL AIRSPACE, AND IN STRAITS USED FOR INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION AND THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE THROUGH TERRITORIAL SEAS.

C. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A ZONE SHOULD NOT AFFECT THE EXISTING RIGHTS OF ITS PARTIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW TO GRANT OR DENY TRANSIT PRIVILEGES, INCLUDING PORT CALLS AND OVERFLIGHT, TO OTHER STATES.

9. US POSITION ON NEGATIVE SECURITY GUARANTEES: ON JUNE 12, SECRETARY VANCE, SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE PRESIDENT, SAID BEGIN QUOTE THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST ANY NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATE PARTY TO THE NPT OR ANY COMPARABLE INTERNATIONALLY BINDING COMMITMENT NOT TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES, EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF AN ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES, ITS TERRITORIES OR ARMED FORCES, OR ITS ALLIES, BY SUCH A STATE ALLIED TO A

NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATE, OR ASSOCIATED WITH A NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATE IN CARRYING OUT OR SUSTAINING THE ATTACK. END QUOTE.

10. US POSITION ON THE PROPOSED NORDIC NWFZ: THE UNITED STATES COULD NOT SUPPORT A PROPOSAL TO CREATE A NORDIC NWFZ, AND IF MOMENTUM FOR SUCH A ZONE WERE TO BUILD WOULD OPPOSE IT. IN THE US VIEW SUCH A NWFZ WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE SINCE TWO OF THE STATES IN THE AREA ARE MEMBERS OF NATO, AND SINCE NATO'S NUCLEAR POSTURE IS AN INTEGRAL PART

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OF THE DETERRENT AGAINST BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL ATTACK. A NORDIC NWFZ WOULD, IN EFFECT, CONSTITUTE A NUCLEAR NON-USE AGREEMENT IN THE NORDIC AREA. WHILE THE NORDIC AREA HAS A POLITICAL IDENTITY, IT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A GEOGRAPHICAL REGION COMPATIBLE WITH THE CONCEPT OF A NWFZ SINCE A NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE, THE USSR, IS ADJACENT AND HAS SIGNIFICANT NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES WHICH POSE A THREAT TO COUNTRIES IN THE REGION.

11. GUIDANCE AND TALKING POINTS: THE US SHOULD NOT TAKE THE LEAD IN OPPOSING THE FINNISH PROPOSAL. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD NOT INDICATE ANY SUPPORT FOR IT OR ENCOURAGE IT IN ANY WAY.

THE MATERIAL IN PARAS 7-9 ABOVE AND THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS MAY BE USED AS APPROPRIATE IN RESPONSE TO QUERIES OR IN WORKING DISCUSSIONS AT THE SSOD:

-- IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT THE NORDIC AREA IS COMPATIBLE

WITH THE CONCEPT OF A FORMAL NWFZ, NOR IS IT CLEAR THAT ALL OF THE STATES CONCERNED ARE INTERESTED IN PURSUING THE FINNISH PROPOSAL.

-- WE FIND THE PROPOSAL UNBALANCED. WHILE IT WOULD EX-
CLUE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM THE FOUR SCANDINAVIAN STATES,
TWO OF THEM MEMBERS OF NATO, IT WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
SOVIET NUCLEAR FORCES IN THE ADJACENT KOLA PENINSULA AND
SURROUNDING WATERS, OR SOVIET SSBNS IN THE BALTIC, WHICH
POSE A POTENTIAL MILITARY THREAT TO THE STATES OF THE PRO-
POSED ZONE. WE SEE IMBALANCE ALSO IN THE SINGLING OUT FOR
MENTION OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS UNDER DEVELOPMENT--
CRUISE MISSILES AND THE SO-CALLED "NEUTRON BOMB"--WITHOUT
MENTIONING SUCH NEW DEPLOYED SOVIET THEATER NUCLEAR SYS-
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STEMS AS THE SS-20 MISSILE AND THE BACKFIRE BOMBER.

-- WHILE THE US IS ALWAYS PREPARED TO GIVE CONSIDERATION
TO ANY SERIOUS DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL, WE DO NOT FIND THIS
REVIVAL OF A FIFTEEN-YEAR-OLD FINNISH PROPOSAL A REASONABLE
OR PROMISING BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION.

12. FOR HELSINKI: FOREGOING POINTS MAY BE USED AS YOU
THINK APPROPRIATE. WITH REGARD TO UNDER SECRETARY
KORHONEN'S REQUEST FOR SPECIFIC POINT OF CONTACT IN USG ON
THIS ISSUE (PARA 8 HELSINKI 1916), YOU MAY RESPOND THAT WE
ARE ALWAYS WILLING TO DISCUSS IN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS ANY
QUESTION THAT FINLAND WOULD LIKE TO RAISE, IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.
HOWEVER, DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE SORT IMPLIED BY THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A SPECIFIC CONTACT WOULD NOT BE USEFUL
AT LEAST UNTIL THE PROPOSAL HAS BEEN CONSIDERED FURTHER BY
THE NORDIC COUNTRIES AND THE USSR. VANCE

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

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